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INTERSTATE WATER ALLOCATION: A CONTEMPORARY PRIMER
FOR EASTERN STATES
Robert Haskell Abrams*
Interstate water allocation law in the United States is roughly 100 years
old at this point in history. To date, with a few notable exceptions, the states
of the American West have made the law. This is to be expected because
allocation becomes vital as a means of providing predictability and security
of right under conditions of scarcity and competition for use of the limited
supply of water. Throughout its history, the American West has known wa-
ter scarcity. By comparison, the American East has had only limited, epi-
sodic experience with water scarcity to date and even less recent experience
with interstate water allocation.
By most quantitative measures, the issue of scarcity remains a West-
only problem. Numerous contemporary examples belie that appearance.
Arkansas, for instance, is a water rich eastern state that is experiencing sub-
stantial declines in aquifer water levels and numerous competing demands
for its surface flows. Importantly, Arkansas has as a neighbor, Texas, a state
with a huge water appetite and a reputation (deserved or not) for seeking to
slake its water thirst on a grand scale from any and all sources. Absent inter-
state allocation, Arkansas may risk having Texas or other states initiate use
of water that otherwise would be available to meet Arkansas's water needs.
This article examines interstate water allocation law and suggests a course
of action to states that are at risk of losing water to their sister states.
The principal thesis of this article is that allocation matters. It matters
because, absent allocation, states that want to conserve their water resources
for either future intrastate use or for present in situ use are at risk of having
sister states use that water in other inconsistent ways. Interstate allocation
also matters because, if there is not a negotiated agreement, water use is
sufficiently similar to a zero sum game in that there will be winners and
losers and the winning strategy is easily identified. Under the most recent
and detailed United States Supreme Court precedent, states engaged in pre-
sent development and use of the water will win the greater entitlements.'
The goal of this article is to set forth the legal underpinnings of those con-
clusions and then suggest to states favoring present conservation and in situ
uses how they can best avoid being the losers.
This article proceeds from several premises about water allocation law
and biases regarding entitlements that should be stated at the outset. First,
* Professor of Law, Wayne State University Law School. A.B. 1969, J.D. 1973, Uni-
versity of Michigan.
1. See Colorado v. New Mexico, 467 U.S. 310 (1984) ("New Mexico If'); Colorado v.
New Mexico, 459 U.S. 176 (1982) ("New Mexico ").
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despite the combination of the commerce power and the Supremacy Clause
that together allow the national government to propound a meaningful water
policy with allocative features, the national government has not done so and
is unlikely to do so any time soon. Accordingly, the initiative has fallen to
the states. Second, the originally stated central principle of equitable appor-
tionment, the right of all states riparian to a watercourse to share fairly in its
benefits, properly conceives the principle on which interstate allocations
should be based. The modem Supreme Court has lost sight of this principle.
Third, solutions that minimize diversions, including conservation and limit-
ing environmentally disruptive water use, ought to be the norm in water use.
Ironically, advancing this norm may require that states seeking to improve
conservation engage in a race to use water in order to secure a measure of
control over the allocated water source. This tactic is correct under the law
as it stands; it is the law of equitable apportionment that needs to be re-
turned to its roots to facilitate maintenance of riparian systems.
I. WATER ALLOCATION AND AMERICAN FEDERALISM
In the United States, as elsewhere, water bodies often form geopolitical
boundaries or flow across those boundaries. As such, those waters them-
selves are not wholly within the jurisdiction and control of a single sover-
eign, a condition that has the potential to spawn conflict over the use of the
water. Where there is such a conflict, eventually there must also be an allo-
cation of the water between the competing parties.
The American federal system offers the possibility of national control
and policy making in relation to interstate water resources. The interstate
commerce power 2 and the Supremacy Clause3 undoubtedly grant Congress
a basis to determine how interstate waters are to be used and allocated.
Similarly, the grant of original jurisdiction to the United States Supreme
Court in state versus state disputes establishes a forum capable of adjudicat-
ing such cases.4
Though not part of a comprehensive national water policy, the Ameri-
can federal system has developed four distinct, reasonably well-articulated
ways to allocate water between states. These are (1) equitable apportion-
ment by the United States Supreme Court; (2) interstate compact; (3) con-
gressional apportionment; and (4) in cases that require adjudication in ad-
2. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
3. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2.
4. Justice Holmes, in an interstate water pollution case, explained this grant as a substi-
tute for belligerency that would be the means of dispute resolution among the states in the
absence of such a federal power. See Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496, 521 (1906), super-




vance of the aforementioned forms of allocation, common law judicial deci-
sionmaking.
A. Allocation by Equitable Apportionment
As part of the complexity of federal and state relations embodied in the
United States Constitution, the United States Supreme Court was given ju-
risdiction to entertain suits by one of the several states against another.5 In
the exercise of this jurisdiction, the Supreme Court is authorized to provide
a form of binding resolution to disputes that the states themselves cannot
settle as co-equal sovereigns, each unable to bind the other. Using this juris-
diction, the Supreme Court has allocated interstate water pursuant to an
equitable apportionment only a handful of times.6 States, depending on their
interests, have stressed positions favoring allocation on the basis of contri-
bution to streamflow, equality of use, and priority in time of use, as well as
more complex allocation principles. As reviewed more fully later in this
article,7 the outcomes of the cases have varied as to what allocative princi-
ples will be determinative.
B. Allocation by Interstate Compacts
Compacts are special. They are a constitutionally sanctioned mecha-
nism that begins with an agreement of states cast into state legislation,
thereafter enacted by Congress.8 As such, the United States Supreme Court
has shown a firm unwillingness to do anything other than enforce compacts
according to their terms. This is, essentially, a separation of powers induced
deference that arises from the extraordinary pedigree of compacts.9 Thus,
the Court will not exercise discretion-equitable or otherwise-to grant
relief from the obligation that compacts confer upon participating states.' 0
The Court will adjudicate whether there is a breach of the compact and, if
so, devise a remedy for the breach. Notably, both compacts and congres-
5. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
6. See Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589 (1945) (protecting Colorado's use of the
North Platte River even though its uses were out of priority); New Jersey v. New York, 283
U.S. 336 (1931) (demonstrating that interstate water disputes and equitable apportionment
are not confined to the West); Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419 (1902) (allowing a "mass
allocation" to one state while leaving the rest for downstream states).
7. See infra Part III.
8. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
9. See Texas v. New Mexico, 462 U.S. 554 (1983).




sional apportionments11 codify and lend federal power to enforce an alloca-
tion of the resource and put the force of the Supremacy Clause behind it.
12
C. Allocation by Congressional Apportionment
Historically, congressional apportionment has rarely been used. There
are two examples. The first is the highly visible decision in Arizona v. Cali-
fornia,13 in which the Court concluded that the Boulder Canyon Project Act
had allocated the waters of the lower basin of the Colorado River.' 4 The
other example is a recent statute addressing the Truckee-Carson situation.15
In the latter case, the congressional action confirmed and reflected a long
process of negotiation that reached a consensus between the two states in-
volved and the federal government on behalf of Indian tribes. 16 Congres-
sional apportionments of this latter type are quite similar to interstate com-
pacts.1 7 They proceed from a basic agreement of the states that precedes
congressional action. Congress, of course, has the authority to dictate water
allocations to the states even without state agreement. The two precedents
for congressional allocation, assuming that they are representative of what is
likely to follow, show that congressional apportionment is not a likely
means to resolving otherwise unresolved interstate water disputes. Forcing a
resolution upon non-agreeing states by congressional apportionment would
require a degree of political will that Congress has shown little ability to
muster.
D. Allocation by Judicial Decisions in Private Litigation
All of the mechanisms for allocating water described thus far require
the participation of the government, the affected states, and either the
United States Supreme Court or Congress. Water users at times need resolu-
11. See infra Part I.C.
12. For the purposes of this discussion, congressional apportionments closely resemble
interstate compacts in that Congress acts, raising separation of powers concerns, but the
actions are in the nature of ordinary statutes that are the typical grist of the judicial review
mill. Realistically, when Congress expressly allocates an interstate water body, it seems
likely that the Court will be very deferential, making congressional apportionment similar to
compacts for the purposes of this discussion.
13. 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
14. Id. at 565.
15. Truckee-Carson-Pyramid Lake Water Rights Settlement Act, Pub.L. No. 101-618,
104 Stat. 3294 (1990).
16. Id.
17. Although large numbers of congressional apportionments are not pouring forth,
Congress has several under discussion, usually melding consensual interstate water dispute
resolution with the concurrent resolution of tribal (federal) claims to water and federal mone-
tary appropriations for water projects that make water more readily available for use.
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tion of disputes in advance of any such overarching interstate allocation.
The leading case in this field, although almost a century old, remains Bean
v. Morris.18 In Bean, downstream senior water appropriators in Wyoming
successfully obtained relief against an upstream junior appropriator in Mon-
tana. Writing for the Court, Justice Holmes noted that, historically, states
along a shared waterway "were willing to ignore boundaries, and allowed
the same rights to be acquired from outside the State that could be acquired
from within."' 9 Noting that both states to the controversy were (and remain)
prior appropriation jurisdictions and that the same stream later flowed back
into Montana, Holmes deemed it "suicide" for Montana to do other than
accede to a unified priority system. 20 This was true even though doing so in
this case would deny any water to Bean, a Montana water user. This posi-
tion is founded on the belief that the affected state would extend comity to
rights created under the laws of a sister state.
Despite its unique federalism and the possibility of federal domination
of interstate water and water policy in general, 2' since the framing of the
Constitution, United States water law and decisions regarding water alloca-
tion are mainly regarded as matters of state prerogative. 22 This deference to
the states is because the several states were sovereigns that together joined
and ceded only a portion of their sovereignty to the nation. A part of the
retained sovereignty was the police power and the authority to determine
property rights, including water rights.23 Thus, history explains the defer-
ence extended to the states in the water policy and water allocation area.
The power given to the national government served two roles, arbiter of
disputes that the states themselves could not resolve and confirmator of
agreements the states themselves had reached. In the latter half of the twen-
tieth century, the power of the national commerce power came to play a
third, essentially negative role, that of guarantor of the freedom of move-
ment of articles of commerce that now included water.24
18. 221 U.S. 485 (1911).
19. Id. at 487.
20. Id.
21. The relationship of water use to interstate commerce is so strong that even in the era
of United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), it seems unthinkable that federal law setting
national water policy would be viewed as beyond Congress's interstate commerce power.
22. There is a distinct exception to this generalization-reserved rights that arise where
the federal government withdraws lands from the public domain and reserves the lands for
particular federal purposes. Such lands are benefited by rights to then-unappropriated waters
in amounts necessary to fulfill the primary purposes of the reservation. See, e.g., Cappaert v.
United States, 426 U.S. 128 (1976) (Devil's Hole National Monument); Winters v. United
States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908) (Indian reservations).
23. The clearest statements of this position appear in a variety of contexts in which the
Supreme Court invokes what is known as the "Equal Footing Doctrine." See, e.g., Pollard v.
Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845).
24. See infra Part III.A.
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II. THE EARLY HISTORY OF AMERICAN INTERSTATE WATER LAW
Beginning roughly a century ago, the Supreme Court, led by Justice
Holmes and Justice Brewer, announced a very clear picture of how water
resources were to be governed. The pivotal dichotomy was whether the wa-
ters were intrastate in character or interstate. Intrastate waters were wholly
within the power of the state to allocate. In the words of Justice Holmes's
Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter25 opinion:
Leaving [the problems of irrigation] on one side, it appears to us that
few public interests are more obvious, indisputable and independent of
particular theory than the interest of the public of a State to maintain the
rivers that are wholly within it substantially undiminished, except by
such drafts upon them as the guardian of the public welfare may permit
for the purpose of turning them to a more perfect use. This public inter-
est is omnipresent wherever there is a State, and grows more pressing as
population grows. It is fundamental, and we are of opinion that the pri-
vate property of riparian proprietors cannot be supposed to have deeper
roots. Whether it be said that such an interest justifies the cutting down
by statute, without compensation, in the exercise of the police power, of
what otherwise would be private rights of property, or that apart from
statute those rights do not go to the height of what the defendant seeks to
do, the result is the same. But we agree with the New Jersey courts, and
think it quite beyond any rational view of riparian rights that an agree-
ment, of no matter what private owners, could sanction the diversion of
an important stream outside the boundaries of the State in which it
flows. The private right to appropriate is subject not only to the rights of
lower owners but to the initial limitation that it may not substantially
diminish one of the great foundations of public welfare and health.
We are of opinion, further, that the constitutional power of the State to
insist that its natural advantages shall remain unimpaired by its citizens
is not dependent upon any nice estimate of the extent of present use or
speculation as to future needs. The legal conception of the necessary is
apt to be confined to somewhat rudimentary wants, and there are bene-
fits from a great river that might escape a lawyer's view. But the State is
not required to submit even to an aesthetic analysis. Any analysis may
be inadequate. It finds itself in possession of what all admit to be a great
public good, and what it has it may keep and give no one a reason for its
will.
26
Interstate waters stood in quite a different posture. Writing the opinion
for the Court in New Jersey v. New York,27 Justice Holmes proclaimed:
25. 209 U.S. 349 (1908).
26. Id. at 356-57.
27. 283 U.S. 336 (1931).
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A river is more than an amenity, it is a treasure. It offers a necessity of
life that must be rationed among those who have power over it. New
York has the physical power to cut off all the water within its jurisdic-
tion. But clearly the exercise of such a power to the destruction of the in-
terest of lower States could not be tolerated. And on the other hand
equally little could New Jersey be permitted to require New York to give
up its power altogether in order that the river might come down undi-
minished.
28
The view that Holmes espoused has been established as the guiding le-
gal precept of Supreme Court equitable apportionment, the method of adju-
dication by which states unable to agree on shared use of an interstate water
body submit their grievance for judicial resolution. In Kansas v. Colorado,29
Justice Brewer stated:
We must consider the effect of what has been done upon the conditions
in the respective States and so adjust the dispute upon the basis of equal-
ity of rights as to secure so far as possible to Colorado the benefits of ir-
rigation without depriving Kansas of the like beneficial effect of a flow-
ing stream .... One cardinal rule, underlying all the relations of the
States to each other, is that of equality of right. Each State stands on the
same level with all the rest. It can impose its own legislation on no one
of the others, and is bound to yield its own views to none. Yet, whenever
... the action of one State reaches through the agency of natural laws
into the territory of another State, the question of the extent and the
limitations of the rights of the two States becomes a matter of justiciable
dispute between them, and this court is called upon to settle that dispute
in such a way as will recognize the equal rights of both and at the same
time establish justice between them. In other words, through these suc-
cessive disputes and decisions this court is practically building up what
may not improperly be called interstate common law.
30
Taking the early precedents together, there is a first order limitation on
the use of water in a shared basin-no single state can command the entire
28. Id. at 342.
29. 206 U.S. 46 (1907).
30. Id. at 97-98, 100.
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resource to the detriment of a sister state that is riparian 31 to that water-
course.
32
III. INTERSTATE WATER ALLOCATION LAW IN THE LATE TWENTIETH
CENTURY
Two things changed in interstate water law in the latter portion of the
twentieth century: the ability of a state to control its intrastate waters and the
jurisprudence of equitable apportionment cases. Both of these events had a
similar effect-they restricted the ability of a state to defeat efforts of sister
states to appropriate water, intrastate or interstate. Both events have the un-
intended consequence of promoting present water use as the basis upon
which states can best compete for scarce water.
A. The Dormant Commerce Clause Before and After Sporhase v. Ne-
braska
33
The first change is the extension of dormant Commerce Clause 34 pro-
tection to include water as an article of commerce that cannot be hoarded.
This change repudiates the previously described doctrine of state hegemony
over intrastate waters that Justice Holmes announced in Hudson County
31. There is a bit of intentional ambiguity as to the possibility of a non-riparian state
being able to insist on the beneficial use of a water body to which it is non-riparian. To date,
all states that have obtained allocated rights by apportionment or compact have been ripari-
ans. There are, however, occasional cases in which courts have granted protection to water
users located in states that are not riparian to the source water body. See, e.g., Erickson v.
Queen Valley Ranch, 99 Cal. Rptr. 446 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971). This paper will make no effort
to explicate the rights, if any, of a non-riparian state.
32. The most recent cases have quoted, but not honored this principle. See New Mexico
11, 467 U.S. 310 (1984), discussed infra Part III.B.
33. 458 U.S. 941 (1982). In Sporhase, a Nebraska statute required all persons who
intended to withdraw groundwater from the state and transport it to another state to first
secure a permit from the Nebraska Department of Water Resources. The permit would be
granted upon approval of the director of water resources as long as the withdrawal was rea-
sonable, not contrary to conservation or public good, and the delivery state granted reciprocal
rights for the same to Nebraska. The Court held that groundwater is commerce that can be
regulated by Congress, and that the reciprocity requirement violated the Commerce Clause as
an impermissible burden on interstate commerce. Id. at 957-58.
34. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The adjective "dormant" is used to describe the situa-
tion where Congress, which has constitutional authority to act in the field by virtue of the
commerce power, refrains from doing so. Protecting the principle so pithily stated by Justice
Jackson in H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525, 537 (1949), that "our eco-
nomic unit is the Nation," the judiciary protects the free flow of interstate commerce by




Water.3 5 Unlike the change in equitable apportionment jurisprudence, this
change was evident even in the first half of the twentieth century as the Su-
preme Court began to invalidate protectionist state laws as they applied to
natural resources 36 on dormant Commerce Clause grounds. Announced as
applying to water resources in Sporhase, this doctrine operates to debar a
state from enacting laws that discriminate against the export of water to a
sister state.37
After Sporhase, states are not wholly powerless in their efforts to limit
water exports. The dormant Commerce Clause doctrine, as explained in
Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.38 allows a state to justify discriminatory regula-
tion where it is strictly necessary due to a compelling governmental interest.
The underlying water shortage conditions that satisfy so high a standard,
however, are seldom faced by most eastern states when they pass laws that
attempt to prevent water exports, nor are export bans the least commercially
burdensome way to address the problem. In other contexts, import and ex-
port bans have been labeled virtually per se unconstitutional.
Evenhanded regulation is permitted;39 thus, a state that imposes strin-
gent conservation requirements on its own water users as a condition of
holding a water right can impose like conditions on exports. This opens up
the possibility that what may amount to de facto unequal application of de
jure evenhanded water allocation statutes can act very much like an export
ban. Doctrines of deference to administrative decisionmaking limit the abil-
ity of judicial review to discern discriminatory application of facially even-
handed criteria. A possible example of this strategy can be seen in the effort
of the State of New Mexico to prevent El Paso, Texas, from appropriating
and exporting large amounts of New Mexico groundwater. 40 The history
there begins with an export ban that, after Sporhase, was invalidated on
dormant Commerce Clause grounds. 41 After that, New Mexico added a stat-
ute that required diversion not be "contrary to conservation of water within
the state" and "not otherwise detrimental to the public welfare of the citi-
zens of New Mexico. ' '42 The revised statute survived a challenge to its facial
35. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
36. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1923) (natural gas); West v.
Kan. Natural Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229 (1911) (natural gas).
37. The Court carved out a possible exception for states that are "demonstrably arid."
See Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 958. This does not include states such as Arkansas or other eastern
states whose average rainfall plainly does not allow them to qualify as demonstrably arid.
38. 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
39. See, e.g., Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960); Chas-
saniol v. City of Greenwood, 291 U.S. 584 (1934); Fed. Compress & Warehouse Co. v.
McLean, 291 U.S. 17 (1934).
40. See City of El Paso v. Reynolds, 563 F. Supp. 379 (D.N.M. 1983).
41. Id. at 388.
42. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-12B-1(C) (Michie Repl. 1997); see also N.M. STAT. ANN.
2002]
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validity.43 The state engineer thereafter denied El Paso's application to ex
port groundwater, and after litigating for a time, the case was settled on
terms favorable to New Mexico.44 Another possible means of limiting water
exports is the state taking control of water and making all new large scale
water uses the subject of a state-run leasing program. Montana has done
this.45 Here, the state has the same administrative power to grant or deny
applications with reference to a multi-factor public interest standard, but the
leasing mechanism allows the state to charge a price as a deterrent to overly
large uses. In addition, lease terms are limited in duration, bringing the wa-
ter back under state control for reallocation at a later date.
B. Colorado v. New Mexico ("New Mexico /,)46 and Colorado v. New
Mexico ("New Mexico IJ)47
The less heralded change in interstate water allocation law occurred in
the Supreme Court's handling of an equitable apportionment case involving
Colorado and New Mexico, both prior appropriation states. This case can
easily be overlooked. It lacks obvious importance because the result simply
applies the doctrine of prior appropriation, the water law of each of the dis-
putant states, on a streamwide basis, something that at least one prior equi-
table apportionment case had done.48 Moreover, it was not a case to capture
the imagination. As it reached the Supreme Court it involved only 4000
acre-feet of water4 9 to be appropriated from the Vermejo River, which flows
out of a relatively unpopulated segment of Colorado into New Mexico. The
case resulted in what seemed to be a fact dominated dispute between the
§ 72-12-3(E) (Michie Supp. 2002).
43. See Reynolds, 563 F. Supp. at 391-92.
44. See JOSEPH SAX ET AL., LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER RESOURCES 768-71 (3d ed.
2000).
45. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-311 (2001). Mentioning this statute in this context is
not meant to imply that Montana has used its water leasing law to evade Sporhase.
46. 459 U.S. 176 (1982).
47. 467 U.S. 310 (1984).
48. Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419 (1922); cf Bean v. Morris, 221 U.S. 485
(1911) (extending comity to priority diversions in a sister state). For a discussion of Bean,
see supra note 18 and accompanying text.
49. The case was litigated in the Supreme Court on objections to the report of the Spe-
cial Master that advocated an award to Colorado of only 4000 acre-feet of water. Colorado
had obtained a conditional decree in Colorado water court for a diversion of seventy-five
cubic feet per second, which is roughly equal to 150 acre-feet per day. Action by the right
holder to proceed to divert that water was enjoined by a New Mexico federal court in Kaiser
Steel Corp. v. Colo. Fuel & Iron Steel Corp., Civil No. 76-224 (D.N.M. 1976). Notably, the
Colorado water court, by the mere fact of granting the conditional decree to Colorado Fuel &
Iron Steel Corp., did not extend comity to New Mexico water rights.
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majority and a sole dissenter about whether Colorado had met its burden of
proof in the case.
Despite appearances, there are three things in the Vermejo River litiga-
tion that stand out: (1) the promulgation of a series of inquiries and proof
standards that make up an equitable apportionment; (2) the way in which
solicitude for current users affected the proof required to sustain a case; and
(3) the fact that, when all was said and done, Colorado got no water whatso-
ever.
1. Specifying the Parameters of the Equitable Apportionment Cause
ofAction
In the first Colorado v. New Mexico Supreme Court opinion, the Court,
in a mere footnote, explained the nature and basis of what it considered to
be a prima facie case for a complainant state and the grounds of defense that
could be asserted:
Our cases establish that a state seeking to prevent or enjoin a diversion
by another state bears the burden of proving that the diversion will cause
it "real or substantial injury or damage." This rule applies even if the
State seeking to prevent or enjoin a diversion is the nominal defendant in
a lawsuit. In Colorado v. Kansas, for instance, Colorado sued Kansas
seeking to enjoin further lawsuits by Kansas water users against Colo-
rado users. Although Kansas was the defendant, we granted Colorado an
injunction based on Kansas'[s] failure to sustain the burden of showing
that the Colorado diversions had "worked a serious detriment to the sub-
stantial interests of Kansas."
New Mexico must therefore bear the initial burden of showing that a di-
version by Colorado will cause substantial injury to the interests of New
Mexico. In this case New Mexico has met its burden since any diversion
by Colorado, unless offset by New Mexico at its own expense, will nec-
essarily reduce the amount of water available to New Mexico users.
The burden has therefore shifted to Colorado to establish that a diversion
should nevertheless be permitted under the principle of equitable appor-
tionment. Thus, with respect to whether reasonable conservation meas-
ures by New Mexico will offset the loss of water due to Colorado's di-
version, or whether the benefit to Colorado from the diversion will sub-
stantially outweigh the possible harm to New Mexico, Colorado will
bear the burden of proof. It must show, in effect, that without such a di-
version New Mexico would be using "more than its equitable share of
the benefits of a stream." Moreover, Colorado must establish not only
2002]
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that its claim is of a "serious magnitude," but also that its position is
supported by "clear and convincing evidence."
50
Despite the citation to proof standards required in previous cases, the
Court's distillation of prior cases, which had been far more open-ended in
their approach, into a set of discrete, sequential inquiries each having an
allocated burden of proof was novel. That specification transformed what
previously had been a search for fairness guided by broad principles of the
equality of sovereign states into a less robust inquiry. It changed the case
from one of seeking to do equity under all of the circumstances and pursu-
ing the great equitable maxim that "equality is equity" to something more
akin to an action at law where an unfair outcome is tolerated as the price of
having predictable legal outcomes that assist citizens in planning their ac-
tivities and investments.
2. Placing the Greatest Burden on the State Seeking To Wrest Water
Away from Current Users
Even before the remand to the special master, Justice O'Connor (the
author of the later majority opinion) and Justice Powell wrote separately to
express their extreme hesitancy to police waste or require diminution of
present use in one state to benefit an as yet uninitiated use in the competing
state. 51 Following remand to the special master, who concluded that Colo-
rado had met the burden set by the Court and was entitled to a decree, the
Court reviewed and rejected the special master's key conclusions. Specifi-
cally, the majority disagreed with the special master's assessment that Colo-
rado had ample use for the water and that New Mexico could avoid injury
by taking reasonable conservation measures.52 This lack of deference to the
fact findings of the special master is, in itself, surprising. Normally, the
Court treats facts found by a special master as correct unless clearly errone-
ous, much in the manner of an appellate court reviewing a trial judge's fact
findings.53
50. New Mexico I, 459 U.S. 176, 188 n.13'(1982) (internal citations omitted); see also
Colorado v. Kansas, 320 U.S. 383 (1943); Washington v. Oregon, 297 U.S. 517 (1936); New
Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336 (1931); Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660
(1931); Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907).
51. New Mexico 1, 459 U.S. at 191 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
52. New Mexico 17, 467 U.S. 310, 318 (1984).
53. See FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a). Perhaps the Court's action can be considered to be a
review of a mixed question of fact and law. This possibility is undercut by a number of
points made in Justice Stevens's dissent, where he recounts specific fact findings that the




While this may appear to be a small point of disagreement about the
conclusions to be drawn from facts, what the majority did is at odds with
standard practice in western states with regard to water administration. Con-
sider here the New Mexico II majority's own statement regarding the lack of
conservation and rigorous administration in New Mexico: "New Mexico's
attempt to excuse three decades of non-use in this way is, at the very least,
suspect., 54 Normally, in the West, when a water user seeks to confirm a
water right in a transfer proceeding,55 the burden on the issue of non-use is
squarely on the party seeking to propagate the water right. The burden is
placed this way because it is well-understood that many, if not most, rights
claimed are exaggerated by the claimants to secure a priority for a greater
amount of water than that actually being used. Applying scrutiny to claimed
rights in transfer proceedings protects juniors by ensuring that the trans-
ferred right is calculated with reference to the real status quo ante, historic
use, instead of unsupported paper claims. The imperative is to decrease the
right to actual historic use, and the burden is on the right holder, not the
opponent.56 Even beyond the transfer context, western states are increasing
their scrutiny of conservation practices on heavily appropriated streams
realizing that the most readily available water to support valuable new uses
is to be obtained by loosening the grip of entrenched inefficiency. 5" The
New Mexico II majority sets a bad precedent that ignores the need for proof
of historic use and rewards inefficiency.
There is little in logic or policy to support the majority in its willing-
ness to allow potentially overstated claims to escape scrutiny. The only fig
leaf available to the majority is a variant of the "bird in the hand" adage.
The majority claims that its rule is likely to maximize welfare because it
protects known values that inhere in existing economies against displace-
ment by speculative potential economies.58 This theory may sound plausible
in the abstract, but it cannot withstand scrutiny. Overstated or wasteful and
inefficient uses are, almost by definition, not beneficial uses. In the Vermejo
situation, the only New Mexico water user threatened with reduction of its
claimed historic supply by the special master's recommended decree was
54. New Mexico 11, 467 U.S. at 318.
55. The relevant similarity of an equitable apportionment decree and a transfer proceed-
ing is that each confirm the measure of the right subjudice and protect it against subsequent
attack.
56. A forceful and eloquent modem opinion applying this cardinal rule of prior appro-
priation doctrine is that of Justice Hobbs speaking for the Colorado Supreme Court in Santa
Fe Trail Ranches Property Owners Ass 'n v. Simpson, 990 P.2d 46 (Colo. 1999).
57. See, e.g., Dep't of Ecology v. Grimes, 852 P.2d 1044 (Wash. 1993).
58. New Mexico I1, 467 U.S. at 323-24; cf RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 850A
(1979) (listing the "protection of existing values of water uses, land, investments and enter-
prises" as one factor among nine that are to be considered when determining whether a ripar-
ian water use is a reasonable use under the totality of the circumstances).
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the Vermejo Conservancy District. Proofs accepted by all sides showed that
the Vermejo Conservancy District ranked as one of the West's least effi-
cient (and least profitable) irrigation districts.59 The Court failed to grasp the
lessons that the western states have painfully learned. Instead of placing
demanding proof burdens on the holders of wasteful, overstated claims, the
New Mexico II majority makes protection of an inefficient existing use the
centerpiece of a decree effectively awarding that poorly used water to the
wastrel in perpetuity.
3. Awarding a State No Water
In the end, Colorado gets no use of the river. All of the water is allo-
cated to New Mexico. Colorado's equities in this matter are substantial. It is
riparian to the Vermejo, and three-fourths of the river's flow originates in
Colorado. Colorado wants to take the water via interbasin diversion to the
Prugatoire basin, one that was reliably proven to be overappropriated in the
proceedings that led to the granting of a conditional decree to project pro-
ponent Colorado Fuel and Iron Steel Corporation. The fact that the corpora-
tion believes that it will profit from a multi-million dollar interbasin diver-
sion project is itself a testimonial to the value of the water in Colorado.
Unlike the heavily subsidized water provided to the Vermejo Conservancy
District users in New Mexico, this transfer will not be subsidized. Worst
and most damning, the equality of the states as sovereigns entitled to share
in the bounty of the interstate river is set at naught. The century old words
of Justices Holmes and Brewer are put aside, and the central premise of the
Equal Footing Doctrine-the inherent equality of each of the several
states-is drained of meaning. After New Mexico II, a later developing state
or a conservation oriented state has no choice but to reassess its policy. This
is a terrible blow to absorb.
IV. POST-ALLOCATION CLARITY
In the wake of an interstate allocation,60 the status of the states in rela-
tion to rights to use of water (and to prevent others from use of water from
59. New Mexico II, 467 U.S. at 325 (Stevens, J., dissenting). But cf Tulare Irrigation
Dist. v. Lindsay-Strathmore Irrigation Dist., 45 P.2d 972 (Cal. 1935) (a classic case that paid
lip service to curtailing wasteful uses but sustaining inefficient customary irrigation practices
that were not among the very worst).
60. Allocation, in the sense it is being used here, is only sometimes accomplished by
equitable apportionment, which may not establish quantified allocations for both states in-
volved and frequently establishes only that under present circumstances, the state accused of
overuse is, or is not, overusing the shared basin resource. Private litigation almost never
accomplishes an allocation. But cf SAX ET AL., supra note 44, at 72 (citing complaint in City
of Virginia Beach v. Champion International Corp. in which defendant class action tries to
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the allocated source) is considerably clearer than it .was before the alloca-
tion. The allocation has either quantified the amount of water use available
to the states or confirmed that the status quo is not violative of the principles
the Court now uses in equitable apportionment cases. Even this lesser pro-
nouncement has great significance in light of the Court's immense solici-
tude for protecting existing uses from diminution. Allocation gives rise to
an umbrella concept that permits a state to confidently grant water rights to
users within a state that, in total, do not exceed that state's allocation. Cor-
relatively, rights granted by the state and exercised beyond the coverage of
the allocation umbrella are at risk of being enjoined. The extent of this prin-
ciple is even more far-reaching than might first be imagined.
The easy case is one in which an allocation is exceeded by an upstream
state to the detriment of a downstream state. Such a situation was presented
in Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co.,61 in which
Colorado, speaking first through its state engineer and subsequently through
its judiciary expounding the state constitution, refused to limit water use on
the La Plata River in derogation of its delivery obligations to New Mexico
under the La Plata River Compact. In reliance on the compact as federal
law, ratified by Congress, and the Supremacy Clause, it was an easy matter
for the Supreme Court to overturn the state action and insist that the com-
pact be obeyed without regard to any possible objections based on Colorado
law.
A somewhat harder case is posed when an out-of-state user applies for
a water right for export of some of the water awarded to one state by the
allocation. Commentators disagree on the result.62 The umbrella concept
argues strongly in favor of the right of the state holding the allocation to
localize its water. When this is done expressly in the compact, there is no
question that a state may do SO. 63 Even when the allocation is silent, the
thrust of an allocation is that it divides the beneficial use between the parties
to the allocation. It would be odd indeed if the allocative outcome of a judi-
cial apportionment, congressional apportionment, or the solemn process
followed to form an interstate compact, could be undone by the simple act
of a would-be water user making application for the interstate export of
establish reasonableness of use in upstream state as against all water users in downstream
state).
61. 304 U.S. 92 (1938).
62. Compare Frank Trelease, Interstate Use of Water: Sporhase, El Paso Pike and Ver-
mejo, 22 LAND & WATER L. REv. 315, 339 (1987) (explaining that allocation holder state
may refuse to make water available), with Douglas Grant, State Regulation of Interstate
Water Export, in 4 WATER & WATER RIGHTs 629-31 (Robert Beck ed., 2d ed. 1991).
63. See Intake Water Co. v. Yellowstone River Compact Comm'n, 590 F. Supp. 293 (D.
Mont. 1983), aff'd, 769 F.2d 568 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that when it ratified the compact,
Congress authorized the veto right of each state over any export from the allocated basin).
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water and citing Sporhase to prevent the allocation-holding state from refus-
ing the application.
A variation of the previous scenarios arises when an allocation-holding
state is not harmed by overuse in another state. Recent events support the
umbrella concept analysis of this issue. In a case involving the Republican
River Compact between Colorado, Nebraska, and Kansas, such a claim
came to the fore. There, Kansas sued, alleging upstream diversions denied
the state of an allocation due to it under the compact. In defense, Nebraska
argued that Kansas would not have used the water that Nebraska took in
excess of its allocated amount. The special master ruled that Kansas is not
required to put its allocation to beneficial use and is entitled to an injunction
even absent a showing of injury.64 In reaching that conclusion, the special
master relied on Oklahoma v. New Mexico, 65 in which the Court observed
that "a congressionally approved compact is both a contract and a statute. 6 6
Together with Hinderlider, this approach to compacts makes it clear that
once the rights of states are quantified, that water is wholly under the power
of the state to which it has been allocated. The power includes the right to
insist that the water remain unused or dedicated to an in situ use such as
instream flow or habitat preservation. This total control negates claims
based on the dormant Commerce Clause.67
V. ADVICE FOR STATES THAT DEVELOP MORE SLOWLY OR FAVOR
CONSERVATION
After this exploration of the pre- and post-allocation legal waterscape,
there are actions that ought to be considered by states riparian to a shared,
unallocated water body. The comparison of the legal rules applied before
and after allocation strongly encourage in-state users in the pre-allocation
setting to utilize as much water as possible from that source as quickly as
possible. In a pre-allocation context, there can be no prevention of water
exports according to Sporhase, but in a post-allocation context, Sporhase is
no longer germane. Thus, in a pre-allocation context, the best way to ensure
in-state benefits is to outrace users from other states in putting the water to
use. That same strategy is reinforced because it has a good chance of being
rewarded in the event that there is an equitable apportionment, as in New
64. Kansas v. Nebraska, No. 126 (United States Supreme Court Special Master's
Memorandum of Decision No. 1 Feb. 12, 2001).
65. 501 U.S. 221 (1991).
66. Id. at 235 n.5.
67. Cf Wunniucke v. S. Cent. Timber, 467 U.S. 82 (1984) (holding local favoritism
possible, but not found to be authorized by the relevant legislation); Prudential v. Benjamin,
328 U.S. 408 (1946) (finding local favoritism authorized by Congress).
[Vol. 25
INTERSTATE WATER ALLOCATION
Mexico II. Thereafter, post-allocation law entrenches the larger spoils won
by the more agressive pre-allocation water user.
Water law in general and prior appropriation in particular inspires a
race to rights that encourages over-rapid water use. From an ecological and
water management perspective, adding pressure to obtain a more favorable
allocation in interstate competition for water to the litany of forces already
favoring over-rapid development of water resources is unfortunate at best.
Worse still, a cynical (but accurate) reading of New Mexico I and H adds a
strong incentive to complement haste with waste in winning the greater al-
location of an interstate river. The Supreme Court's methodology for equi-
table apportionment cases gives existing appropriations a degree of pre-
sumptive validity and insulation from scrutiny on the issues of non-use and
waste that they do not enjoy under the law of most states.
Slower developing states or states favoring active conservation will be
hard pressed to protect themselves once interstate competition for their
available water resources begins in earnest. One avenue to consider is to
negotiate an allocation that preserves water for present instream use and
future growth. The benefit to the slower developing states is obvious, but
even the would-be water-aggressor states obtain the benefit of certainty of
right. Litigation over water supply projects makes superfund litigation look
speedy and efficient. In the Southeast, this realization is in all likelihood
what is bringing Georgia to the bargaining table to try to negotiate an inter-
state allocation with its downstream neighbors Alabama and Florida.68 Equi-
table apportionments are unsatisfactory as a prospective allocative device
because the Court acts decisively only when there is an actual conflict be-
tween the states' respective uses.
6 9
Resort to non-allocational devices related to water quality and instream
flow requirements offer a second protective strategy for states that do not
make present beneficial use of the water off stream. These devices have not
previously been used for this purpose, but have had resource protective ef-
fects in other contexts. Under the Clean Water Act (CWA),7° states that
designate uses and water quality standards that are approved by the United
States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) may be able to enforce
68. These states have taken a unique approach by entering compacts that expire in the
event there is a failure to agree on an allocation. See Alabama-Coosa-Talapoosa River Basin
Compact, 105 Pub. L. No. 105, 111 Stat. 2233 (1997); Apalachicola-Chattahoochie-Flint
River Basin Compact, 105 Pub. L. No. 104, 111 Stat. 2219 (1997).
69. Relief is granted only when the Court can find a use in one state is unreasonably
impairing uses in the other. If no real conflict is present, or if the Court finds the present use
in the allegedly overusing state is not unreasonable, the decree will be like that in Kansas v.
Colorado-the present use is not excessive. 206 U.S. 46, 100 (1907). This does not create
any "equity points" on behalf of the complainant state when the litigation is recommenced.
See generally Colorado v. Kansas, 320 U.S. 383 (1943).
70. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2000).
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them against activities in sister states that affect their attainment. In a lead-
ing case, Oklahoma, the downstream state, was able to have upstream ac-
tivities in Arkansas scrutinized to ensure that Arkansas activities did not
violate Oklahoma water quality requirements.71 Importantly, the Oklahoma
standards, once reviewed and approved by the EPA, took on federal water
quality standard status and were, therefore, enforceable as federal law rather
than as attempted extra-territorial enforcement of domestic Oklahoma law.
A similar CWA device involves the section 40172 certification process. Pro-
jects requiring federal licensure, such as hydroelectric dams regulated by the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), must obtain state certifi-
cation that they do not violate the state's water laws. In the leading case, a
FERC approved project had to allow instream releases and flows that the
state required to meet its laws for fish protection, even though FERC had
determined that a lesser amount was adequate for fish protection.73
More speculatively, setting instream flow requirements may serve to
limit activities of out-of-state water users that reduce streamflow. This ap-
proach is more speculative because, unlike the CWA water quality stan-
dards approach, state instream flow requirements that are not part of the
water quality standards program do not become federalized. Even without
that status as federal law, instream flow requirements are evenhanded limi-
tations that avoid dormant Commerce Clause invalidation. Thus, instream
flow requirements can block diversions that seek to export the water to an-
other state. Instream flow requirements also may be respected by the Su-
preme Court as a present use entitled to deference in an equitable appor-
tionment. A final slim possibility created by minimum stream flow require-
ments is that, pursuant to the principles of comity announced in Bean v.
Morris,74 private litigation of interstate water rights would lead a court to
enjoin upstream diversion in respect of the downstream state's instream
flow laws.
This article has painted a gloomy picture, portraying aggressive water
using states as the likely winners of a zero sum game played against slower
developing or conservation-minded states, with the biggest losers being
riverine ecosystems. The law, unwittingly, not only fails to moderate the
Tragedy of the Commons, 75 but also accelerates the race to ruin by adding
yet another incentive to over-rapid and wasteful development. As a coun-
71. See Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91 (1992). In the end, the EPA found that the
Arkansas activities complained of did not result in a substantial violation of the Oklahoma
requirements so no relief was awarded to Oklahoma.
72. 33 U.S.C. § 1341 (2000).
73. PUD No. 1 of Jefferson County v. Washington Dep't of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700
(1994).
74. 221 U.S. 485 (1911).
75. See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 Sci. 1243 (1968).
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terweight, water law throughout history has displayed a pragmatic ability to
self correct. The law of interstate allocation will be reworked to promote
efficiency, and quite likely, the equal footing concept of state entitlements
to shared water resources will reemerge. The real question will be whether it
takes the loss of a myriad of small rivers to over-rapid overuse or a high
profile tragedy before the Court critically revisits the perverse incentives
that now characterize the contemporary law of interstate allocation.

